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The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been a fertile
field for the development of natural-law concepts in American constitutional
law. For a time after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment the Supreme
Court refused to give a substantive meaning to due process,' but this attitude
eventually yielded to a highly individualistic natural-law interpretation of due
process more closely akin to laissez-faire economics than to traditional natural
law.2 For example, the Court held that the setting of railroad rates by state
administrative agencies, whose actions were not subject to court tests of reason-
ableness, violated due process;3 it nullified a New York statute limiting employ-
ment in bakeries to ten hours a day and six days a week, on the ground that
the statute violated "liberty of contract."' Prior to these decisions, the Court
had rejected the contention that due process requires states to grant such pro-
cedural rights as grand jury indictment' and exemption from compulsory self-
incrimination,' both of which are guaranteed in federal courts by the fifth
amendment. Freedom of communication found no federal protection against
state invasion under due process of law until well into the twentieth century.
At the close of the first quarter of the twentieth century, due process of
law served as an effective instrument for protecting the liberty of businessmen,
but it afforded little other protection. Nevertheless, by giving due process a
substantive content, the Court laid the foundation for the broad extension of
civil rights protection against state invasion by judicial interpretation of the due
process clause, which commenced during the 1920's.
Professor d'Entreves has said that "the necessity of referring positive law
to some ideal standard" is one of the problems on which "natural law has a
word to say, that, indeed, natural law is perhaps nothing other than a name for
the right answer." 7 The introduction of substantive due process means that
judges must have some "ideal standard" by which to test state law. The objec-
tives of this paper are: first, to trace the incorporation of freedom of speech
and press into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; second, to
show how the Court employed natural-law standards in that incorporation;
and third, to suggest standards derived from natural-law concepts for inter-
* Professor of Political Science, Frostburg State College (Md.); A.B., Brown University,
1948; M.A., Georgetown University, 1950; Ph.D., Georgetown University, 1963.
1 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
2 See Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural Law Concepts,
25 NoTaR DAM . LAWYER 258, 275-80 (1950).
3 Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
4 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
6 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
7 d'Entreves, The Case for Natural Law Reexamined, I NATURAL L.F. 5, 6 (1956).
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preting and applying the rule that states must respect the right to freedom of
speech and press.
Incorporation of Freedom of Communication
Into the Fourteenth Amendment
In light of the substantive content given the due process clause in the pro-
tection of property and "liberty of contract," it is not surprising that other claims
were advanced under due process, not the least of which were the claimsto
freedom of speech and press. If due process of law has any substantive content,
the right of freedom of communication certainly can be laimed, not only as a
sine qua non of democratic government, but as a fundamental human right
within the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
In the first case in which freedom of the press was claimed under the
fourteenth amendment, the Court sidestepped the issue and held that since there
had been no previous restraint, freedom of the press was not violated.' The
following year the Court ignored the due process issue and upheld a Kentucky
statute forbidding the operation of any institution of learning for both Negro
and white students, on the ground that corporations cannot claim the same
rights under the Constitution as natural persons.9 Dissenting, Justice Harlan
declared that the right to give harmless instruction, or instruction beneficial to its
recipients, was "beyond question, part of one's liberty as guaranteed against
hostile state action by the Constitution of the United States."' 1 A dozen years
later, while upholding a Minnesota statute that forbade teaching or advocating
that citizens of Minnesota should not help the United States in the prosecution
of the war, the Court avoided deciding whether the federal constitution pro-
hibited state deprivation of freedom of expression." Justice Brandeis dissented,
however, finding it hard to believe that the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment "does not include liberty to teach, either in the privacy of the home
or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism; so long, at least, as Congress has not declared
that the public safety demands its suppression."' 2 But the majority of the Court
was still unconvinced, and two years later, abandoning all its earlier qualifica-
tions, the Court declared that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any
other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States
any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' . .. .,,3
Hardly had the Supreme Court definitively declared that freedom of speech
was not protected by the fourteenth amendment, than it began a process that
8 Patterson~v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). The Court said, "We leave undecided
the question whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition similar
to that in the First." Id. at 462.
9 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
10 Id. at 67.
11 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
.12 Id. at 343.
13 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922). 'For-the development of the
Court's attitude toward restriction of freedom, of speech and press by the states before those
freedoms were incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
author is indebted to Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WAsr. 'U.L.Q.
497 (1942) and Note, The Emergence of a Nationalized Bill of Rights: Due Process and
a "Higher Law" of Liberty, 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. 490 (1938).
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could ultimately lead only to a reversal of that declaration. In 1923 the Court
recognized that the fourteenth amendment protected life and liberty, as well
as property, by holding that a statute of Nebraska forbidding the teaching of
a modem foreign language in any school to a child who had not completed the
eighth grade invaded the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 4
And two years later, in another decision reflecting the broadened concept of
liberty under the fourteenth amendment, the Court invalidated an Oregon
statute that virtually required all children to attend public schools." The way
was thus prepared for the obiter dictum in the Gitlow case,'" decided a week
later, which read freedom of speech and press into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' Justice Sanford, speaking for the Court, declared:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from abridg-
ment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and
"liberties" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment from impairment by the States.'8
The importance of this statement was not widely recognized at first,' 9 but
as one writer said a decade and a half later, "[T]he dictum in . . . [this] case
that unwarranted restriction of opinion by a State violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment represents an unqualified advance. The long-range protection inherent
in... [this] position embodies the prospect of ultimate good."2 So readily was
this dictum admitted into the body of our constitutional law, that Justice Bran-
deis could write in a concurring opinion in 1927, before the concept had ever
been applied to invalidate state legislation:
Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive,
it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all
fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by
the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States. The right of free
speech, the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, funda-
mental rights.2 '
14 (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Saying that the Court had never exactly
defined the liberty guaranteed by the- fourteenth amendment, Justice McReynolds, for the
Court, declared:
Without doubt, it denoteg not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Id. at 399.
15, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 '(1925).-
16 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
17 Ibid.
18 Id. at 666.
19 Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 497, 514-15
(1942). One writer who recognized the importance of the statement disapproved of it.
Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 H.vmw L. Rxv. 431
(1926).
20 Johnson, Post-War Protection of Freedom of Opinion, 1 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 192, 196
'(1940).
21 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927).'
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On the same day the Court for the first time held unconstitutional a state statute
limiting freedom of expression. 2 There was no discussion of the freedom pro-
tected, nor even any mention of freedom of speech and press, although it was
clearly implied.
Any doubt that freedom of expression was protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment was finally removed and the protection
made explicit in 1931. Invalidating a decision of a California court upholding
the so-called Red Flag Law,22 the Court explained why freedom of expression
was part of the liberty thus protected. Chief Justice Hughes said:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitu-
tional system. A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively con-
strued, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair
use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Freedom of expression was thus recognized as requisite to the operation of our
system of government. A fortnight later the Court, holding the application of
a Minnesota statute regulating newspapers and periodicals unconstitutional,25
declared, "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of
speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment from invasion by state action."26 Dissenting in this case with
the concurrence of three other justices, Justice Butler conceded that the question
of whether freedom of speech and press were included in the liberty of the
fourteenth amendment "has been finally answered in the affirmative."
2
Natural Law Implications of Incorporation
The Supreme Court, in its incorporation of first amendment freedoms into
the fourteenth amendment, is aware that it is dealing with basic rights- rights
which inhere in the human person - and indeed, that their incorporation rests
on their fundamental character. In the first case incorporating the freedoms
of speech and press, these rights were referred to as "fundamental personal
rights."28 Later, Justice Brandeis said, "Thus all fundamental rights comprised
within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion
by the States."29 In Near v. Minnesota"° Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for
22 Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). The Court declared that the Criminal Syndi-
calism Act of Kansas, as applied, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
23 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
24 Id. at 369.
25 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
26 Id. at 707.
27 Id. at 723-24. For the development of the attitude of the Court toward protection of
freedom of speech and press in the states, see Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 497 (1942).
28 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
29 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion).
30 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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the Court; proclaimed, "It was found impossible to conclude that this essential
personal liberty [of press and speech] of the citizen was left unprotected by
the general guaranty of fundamental rights of person and property."'" Similar
statements about the fundamental character of freedom of speech and press
have been made repeatedly by the Court. 2 Justice Sutherland explicitly recog-
nized the natural law implications of these statements when he wrote of "the
natural right of the members of an organized society, united for their common
good, to impart and acquire information about their common interests.
'33
Reasonable freedom of speech and press is protected against state invasion,
not because the Constitution specifies this freedom as immune from state action,
but because the Court has determined that it is fundamental to the liberty
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
has gone beyond the written law to protect rights that are not only essential to
the operation of government responsible to the people, but also basic to the
dignity of the human being. It has thereby employed principles that can only
be derived from some concept of a higher law. 4 It is this recognition of the
higher-law content implicit in substantive due process that has made possible
the protection of basic rights and liberties against invasion by state government.
Professor Morrison, commenting on Justice Black's objective of taking the
"natural-law gloss" off due process by seeking to apply the first eight amend-
ments to the states, added:
Of course what would really follow from the discard of the natural-law
gloss is that we should restore to the due process clause the meaning it
had before such gloss was imposed upon it. This would be the standard
of English practice as set forth in the Hoboken case in 1856, or at most
the cbncept of the fair trial which was stated in Davidson v. New Orleans
and quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Black in 1938.-5
Due process would then afford little protection against state invasion of individual
rights, including the right to freedom of communication. 6
In specifying freedom of speech and press as a fundamental right included
within the liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court chose a right that is ordinarily included in lists of natural rights."
31 Id. at 707.
32 E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 244 '(1936).
33 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
34 As a recent commentator on the Constitution has said,
Freedom of religion and freedom of communication have often been referred to as
"the fundamental freedoms," as they are natural rights, of such import that the
Founding Fathers amended the Constitution to enshrine them in absolute language
against impairment by the federal government. ANTIEAU, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES 216 (1960).
35 Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140, 172 (1949).
36 Justice Black would probably argue, as he did in his dissent in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947), that the fourteenth amendment makes the first eight amend-
ments apply to the states, but he has never been able to convince a majority of the Supreme
Court that this is so. See Morrison, supra note 35.
37 For a list of natural rights, including communication, and a discussion of them, see
McAniff, The Natural Law - Its Scope and Function, 22 FODHAm L. REv. 246, 249-50
(1953).
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If man is fully to realize his, social and rational nature, this right of speech and
press is essential. Maritain, preferring the designation "freedom of investigation
and discussion" to that of "freedom of speech and expression,", said, "Freedom
of investigation is a fundamental natural right, for man's very nature is to seek
the truth.""8 He added, however, that there may be some regulation of expres-
sion by "positive law." 9
The Court has not only defined freedom of communication as a funda-
mental right, but significantly, it has also recognized that the freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly are essential to a government responsible to the people."
The significance of this recognition transcends the fact that the citizens of the
United States live under a government responsible to the people, or even that
the national government is required under the Constitution to "guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government."'4 In fulfilling
all the characteristics of his nature, therefore, man will participate in the govern-
ment under which he lives.. This recognition fulfills Aristotle's descriptibn of
man as "by nature a political animal,"'4 a characterization St. Thomas expanded
in his translation, "Man is naturally a political or social animal."43 If by nature
man is a political or social animal, that government most suitable to his nature
is one in which he participates, and in present-day conditions such participation
seems to be effected best through some form of representative government. The
effectiveness of representative government rests in part upon freedom of, com-
munication, which the Court has undertaken to protect against state invasion.
Maritain recognized that the nature of man calls for political participation when
he wrote:
The famous saying of Aristotle that man is a political animal does
not mean only that man is naturally made to live in society; it also means
that man naturally asks to lead a political life and to participate actively
in the life of the political community. It is upon this postulate of human
nature that political liberties and political rights rest, and particularly the
right of suffrage."
To be sure, not all peoples have been sufficiently developed or fortunate
enough to realize that aspect of their human nature that calls for political par-
ticipation. But where, as in the United States, institutions for political par-
ticipation exist, the duty to implement and improve them by protecting political
rights, including the right to communicate, is evident. Therefore, by tying the
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly to representative government, the Court
- whether intentionally or otherwise - drew attention to the fact that these
38 MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 89 (Anson transl. 1943).
39 Id. at 89-90.
40 See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). In upholding the right to free-
dom of assembly under the fourteenth amendment, the Court quoted -with approval from its
opinion in an earlier case, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876), "The
very idea of government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its- citizens to
meet peaceably -for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of
grievances." De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
41 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
42 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 54 '(Jowett transl. 1943).
43 AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, in 2 BAsIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
161 (Pegis ed. 1954).
44 MAnIUTAIN, op. cit. supra note 38, at 84.
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freedoms spring from the nature of man, and thus are ultimately derived from
the natural law.
Proposed Tests
The role played by natural-law concepts in the Supreme Court's protection
of freedom of speech and press against state invasion need not end with the
incorporation of this freedom into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Constitution dictates that no state shall "deprive any person
of... liberty... without due process of law," and the Court has determined
that the liberty specified includes a reasonable exercise of freedom of speech
and press. The Court has thereby laid down a general principle, which, to be
meaningful, must be applied in concrete cases. Professor Rommen has said,
"Positive law, then, needs the enduring critic provided by natural law; it must
forever be confronted by objective justice."'45 The need for the natural-law
critic is particularly acute when the positive law is as general as that embodied
im the proposition that the states may not invade freedom of speech and press.
While the Court has developed a number of subsidiary principles to elaborate
its general principle of freedom of communication, the need for natural-law
standards in this vital sector of constitutional law continues.
A study of the natural law engenders questions that can serve as standards
to guide the Court in concrete cases and in developing subsidiary principles
regarding freedom of communication. Does the claimed right to freedom of
speech and press actually promote the exercise of that right in the light of all
circumstances? Does it unnecessarily interfere with the. exercise of equally
important or more important rights? Does it accord with the customs of the
country? Does it conflict with the common good? Although these questions
do not exhaust the possibilities for testing the right to expression, they seem
particularly pertinent, and as will be shown, they appear to have been in the
minds of members of the Court in some cases.
Does the claimed right to freedom of speech and press actually promote
the exercise of that right in all circumstances? Since the right to communicate,
which flows from the sociable and rational nature of man, is a. fundamental
human right, it should be protected.- But not every claim under an acknowl-
edged right should be honored, since the claim might actually lead to a diminu-
tion of the exercise of the right under which it was invoked. When the Asso-
ciated Press argued that it should be exempt from the provisions of the Sherman
Antitrust Act on the basis of freedom of the press, the Court stated:
It would be strange indeed . . . if the grave concern for freedom of the
press which prompted the adoption of the First Amendment should be read
as a command that the government was without power to protect that free-
dom.46
Does the claimed right to freedom of speech and press unnecessarily inter-
fere with the exercise of equally important or more important rights? R. D.
45 Romnmen, Natural Law in Decisions of the 'Federal Supreme Court and of the Con-
stitutional Courts in Germany, 4 NATURAL L.F. 1, 24 (1959).
46 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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Lumb 7 examined the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and Suarez to meet
charges that the natural law is not in fact unchanging, as its defenders have
maintained. He suggested that implied in their method is a recognition that
there is a hierarchy of natural-law duties, so that one natural-law precept has
to step aside when it conflicts with a more important one.
It seems that what they [Aquinas and Suarez] have in mind is the "con-
flict-of-duties" situation. More than one precept may be applicable to the
situation in question. It is true that one must not steal, but one must live,
and situations will arise when not only the principle proscribing theft, but
also the principle which protects human life must be considered. If, as
in the necessity example, the latter principle is applied, what we are doing
is working out in detail a reconciliation between the different precepts in
cases where the features may be subsumed under one or other principle,
and we are also emphasizing the higher value.48
Lumb later suggested that the same sort of approach might be made regarding
rights, pointing out that the felon's right to liberty is overridden by the com-
munity's right to protection. "In such cases, a decision has to be made as to
which right is to be accorded superiority."
49
It is reasonable, then, to argue that there is a hierarchy of rights as well
as duties under the concept of natural law. High in the hierarchy of rights is
the right to life, for without life no rights can be exercised by human beings.
It is significant that the first of the "natural inclinations" to which St. Thomas
referred as instructing the reason about the natural law is that which provides for
"preserving human life."50 Suarez stated that "the right to preserve one's own
life is the greatest right."15 ' The prohibition against stealing may sometimes be
suspended in order that the higher duty, to preserve life, may be carried out."
Similarly, the right to freedom of speech must sometimes bow before the higher
right to life. This hierarchy of rights is given tacit recognition in the order in
which the fifth and fourteenth amendments list rights in their respective due
process clauses- by prohibiting the denial of "life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."'" The first right is to life, the condition of all others; the
second is to liberty, which permits one to live in accordance with his nature;
the third is to property, which provides for man the material goods necessary
for preserving both life and liberty. That the right to life outranks the right to
freedom of speech was implicitly recognized by Justice Holmes when he said,
47 Lumb, Natural Law - An Unchanging Standard, 6 CATHOLIC LAW. 224 (1960).
48 Id. at 227-28.
49 Id. at 233. For other references to the hierarchy of rights, see Wu, FOUNTAIN OF
JUSTICE 105, 130 (1955); Mullaney, The Natural Law, the Family and Education, 24 FoRD-
HAm L. Rxv. 102, 109-10 '(1955).
50 AQUINAS, SuJMMA THEOLOGICA 1009 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans]. 1927).
51 SUAREZ, A Defense of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith, in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THREE
WoRxs 709 (SCOTT ed. 1944).
52 Lumb, supra note 47, at 227-28.
53 A similar order is found in Locke.
The state of nature has a law to govern it which obliges every one; and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions . . .. JOHN LOCxE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 123 (Cook ed.
1947).
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"The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely
shouting fire in a theatre, causing a panic."" The panic to which he-referred
might have endangered life and limb. Thus, the obvious implication of his
oft-repeated statement is that the light to speak must defer to the right to live.
Since World War II, the Supreme Court has embraced the concept of a
truncated hierarchy of rights, holding that the rights of the first amendment
enjoy a "preferred position" in our constitutional system." Since the Court
has never specified the rights over which first amendment rights are preferred,
the unfortunate implication is that first amendment rights are preferred over
all others. An apparent victim of. the "preferred position" doctrine was the
right to privacy in the home, which was imperiled by decisions invalidating
state and local laws regulating or forbidding house-to-house canvassing for reli-
lious purposes."8 The right to privacy in the home provides, when respected, the
conditions essential for the enjoyment of a number of other rights, particularly
the right to rear children. The violation of the ancient English tradition that
a man's house is his castle' was one of the important charges against the King
and Parliament that led to the revolt of the American colonies. As Professor
Chafee has stated:
A man's house is his castle, and what is, more important his wife's castle.
A housewife may fairly claim some protection from being obliged to' leave
off bathing the baby and rush down to the door, only to be asked to
listen to a sermon or a political speech.58
When the fourth amendment speaks of "The right of the people to be secure
in their... houses," it is concerned with protection against intrusion by gov-
ernment officials. If, however, government sees fit to provide protection against
other potential invaders of the privacy of the home, strong reasons must be
54 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
55 The notion was introduced, without commitment to it, in a footnote to the opinion
of the Court in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), but the
words were first actually used in a dissent by Chief Justice Stone, who wrote that "the Con-
stitution, by virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms [of
speech and religion] in a preferred position." Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942).
The following year the idea found its way into an opinion of the Court written by Justice
Douglas, who said, "Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a pre-
ferred position." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). The phrase "pre-
ferred position," referring to one or more first amendment freedoms, was repeated in Follett
v. McCormack, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167
(1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
88 (1949); it became "preferred place" in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 '(1945), and"preferred treatment" in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948). For a discussion of the
use of the concept of "preferred position" by the Court, see the concurring opinion of Justice
Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
56 The Court has invalidated ordinances requiring permits for house-to-house canvass-
ing or solicitation and vesting discretionary authority in the administrative officer issuing
the permits as applied to religious canvassers or solicitors, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and a similar regulation of a village
owned by the United States, Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946). Despite a temporary
lapse, Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), the Court has invalidated ordinances that merely
required the payment of license fees for the sale of literature as applied to religious literature,
Follett v. McCormack, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943),
and an ordinance that simply prohibited house-to-house distribution of advertising material
as applied to advertisements for a religious meeting, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
57 See O'SULLIVAN, THE INHERITANCE OF THE COMMON LAw 38-39 (1951).
58 CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406-07 (1948).
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advanced to overrule the action on the basis of freedom of speech or religion.
As Chafee said, "Freedom of the home is as important as freedom of speech."'5
Happily, the Court has more recently restricted the reach of its invalidation
of laws forbidding house-to-house canvassing by upholding an ordinance that
forbade house-to-house solicitation of orders for merchandise offered for sale,
as applied to a person taking orders for secular magazines.6" Moreover, at about
the same time the Court apparently abandoned the doctrine that the freedoms
of the first amendment occupied a "preferred position" in this type of
case.61 The whole history of the "preferred position" doctrine and its apparent
application to house-to-house canvassing for religious causes illustrate the need
for a carefully defined hierarchy of rights. To argue that something is preferred
without specifying what it is preferred over is at least meaningless (and perhaps
dangerous) in an area where precision of language is demanded; it is the lan-
guage of Madison Avenue, rather than the language appropriate to the highest
court in the land. Justice Frankfurter, speaking of the "preferred position" doc-
trine, complained in a concurring opinion, "I deem it a mischievous phrase, if
it carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law touching com-
munication is infected with presumptive invalidity." 2
Does the claimed right to freedom of speech and press accord with the
customs of the country? St. Thomas argued that custom springs from human
reason through actions, rather than through speech, and it becomes law quite
as much as a law enunciated by human speech. "Accordingly," he said, "cus-
tom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of the law."6 "
St. Thomas further contended that "human law should never be changed, unless,
in some way or other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent
of the harm done in this respect." 4 Thus, he provided what could be a useful
standard for the Court in deciding cases involving freedom of speech and
press.65 A well-established custom, in a sense having "the force of law," ought
to be carefully weighed in any decision of the Court. In the development of
American constitutional law, the Court has made the freedoms of speech and
religion, which not only had been protected to some extent by state constitutions,
59 Id. at 407.
60 Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
61 Dissenting in Breard, Justice Black said:
Today's decision marks a revitalization of the judicial -views which prevailed before
this Court embraced the philosophy that the First Amendment gives a preferred
status to the liberties it protects. I adhere to that preferred position philosophy. .d.
at 650.
Just this year, however, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for eight members of the Court,
indicated the viability of the "preferred position" doctrine when he stated:
Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amend-
ment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under guise of regulating
conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press
suffer. (Emphasis added.) Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).
62 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949). For comments on the danger of con-
sidering certain laws as "infected with presumptive invalidity," see Corwin, The Debt
of American Constitutional Law to Natural Law Concepts, 25 NoTRE DAME LAWYEa 258,
281-82 (1950).
63 AQuIxNAs, op. cit. supra note 50, at 1024.
64 Id. at 1023.
65 For a comprehensive discussion of custom and law, see SUAREZ, op. cit. supra note
51, at 441-646.
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but had become associated with the traditions and customs of the country, en-
forceable against the states as parts of the federal constitution.
In decisions concerning freedom of speech and press, the Court has been
mindful of the demands of custom in developing its own standards. In an early
case applying freedom of the press to a state, the Court invalidated a Minnesota
statute on the ground that it provided for prior censorship of the press," and it
supported its decision by referring to the English struggle "against the legisla-
tive power of the licenser,' 'Gt and by quoting from Blackstone," Madison, 9 and
Patterson v. Colorado." A similar concern for the traditional view was shown
when the Court held unconstitutional a license tax placed on newspapers by the
State of Louisiana.71 The Court again turned to the history of the struggle for
freedom of the press, showing how taxes had been used in England to interfere
with the press and citing various authorities on the subject.' 2 The Court referred
to the fact that taxes on newspapers, magazines, and advertising in Massachu-
setts in the mid-1780's had aroused such opposition that they were soon repealed,
and it argued that the framers of the first amendment were familiar with these
taxes as well as with the struggle for freedom of the press in England, and that
they did not wish to confine that freedom within the narrow boundaries taxation
could erect.7 s
In recently upholding laws against obscenity, the Court established this
standard as part of the test for constitutional proscription: "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests."74 Here
again custom, as defined by "contemporary community standards," plays an
important role in helping the Court to determine the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. These random examples suggest that the Court has been cognizant of
custom in the development and interpretation of constitutional law. The Court
has, of course, in some instances felt obliged to upset well-established customs."5
The author does not intend to imply that the Court should never disturb
an entrenched custom, but that it'should not do so lightly. When a custom is
clearly violative of the right of some persons or is inconsistent with justice, and
it is of sufficient importance to warrant action within the Court's jurisdiction,
then the Court may and must disturb the custom. In such circumstances the
good effects outweigh the ill effects of disturbing the custom of the country, for
the common good will "be compensated according to the extent of the harm
done in this respect."
76
66 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
67 Id. at 713.
68 Id. at 713-14. [4 BLACxSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151, 152].
69 Id. at 714 [MADISON, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 Woans 543]. "
70 Ibid. [205 U.S. 454, 461 (1907)].. ..
71 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 '(1936).
72 Id. at 246-47. The authorities referred to were: 1 COLLETT, HISTORY OF TAXEs ON
KNowL.IGnE; 2 MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 245 (7th ed.); STEWART,
Lennox and the Taxes on Knowledge, 15 SCOTTISH HISTORICAL Ray., 322-27.
73 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936).
74 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). Even more recently, the Court in-
dicated that the Roth standards, with some elaboration, still apply. Ginsburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966).
75 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76 AquInAs, op. cit. supra note 50, at 1023.
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Does the claimed right to freedom of speech and press conflict with the
common good? The exercise of rights becomes a problem only in society, and
only when other persons are affected. A lone man on a remote island may
exercise whatever rights he claims, and even in society a man may think accord-
ing to the dictates of his conscience. But when claimed rights affect other per-
sons, they may be exercised only with regard to the rights of others and society
in general. St. Thomas said, "Every law is ordained to the common good.""7
Suarez wrote:
With respect, then, to the question above set forth [Is it ,inherent in the
nature of law that it be enacted for the sake of the common good?], there
is no dispute among the various authorities; on the contrary, this axiom
is common to them all: it is inherent in the nature and essence of law,
that it shall be enacted for the sake of the common good; that is to say,
that it shall be formulated particularly with reference to that good.78
To assert that the common good must be considered is not to ignore the good
of the individual human being.
The ultimate end of a group of men can, of course, be no different from
the ultimate end of the members, for the group is existentially identical
with the members; the common good must take its plat-e as an implementa-
tion of the good life in the individual citizens.19
Individual good and common good are not so much in conflict as comple-
mentary to each other, even though in isolated instances there may be a con-
flict. The balance between the individual good and the common good was well
expressed by Maritain, when he said, "Because the common good is the human
common good, it includes within its essence . . . the service of the human
person.
' 80
Although the Court uses the words "common good" as rarely as it uses the
words "natural right," both expressions found their way into an opinion written
by Justice Sutherland when he referred to "the natural right of the members
of an organized society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire
information about their common interests."' Throughout the opinions of the
Court involving freedom of speech and press runs the theme that the claimed
right must be considered in the context of the rights, duties, or prerogatives of
society or the state.8 ' In the landmark case that produced "the clear and present
77 Id. at 994.
78 SuA Ez, On Laws and God the Lawgiver, op. cit. supra note 51, at 90.
79 KREILKAMP, THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF THomIsTmC JURISPRUDENCE 128
(1939).
80 MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 19 (Fitzgerald transl. 1947).
81 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
82 In attacking what he refers to as the "ad hoe balancing test," which he says has been
employed by members of the Court, Emerson writes, "The formula is that the court must,
in each case, balance the individual and social interest in freedom of expression against the
social interest sought by the regulation which restricts expression." Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912 '(1963). Without making any
commitment about the propriety of the particular balancing attacked, the statement does
support the idea that the Court is aware of the "social interest" in cases involving freedom
of expression. The "social interest" or interest of sociey cannot be radically different from
the common good.
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danger" test,"' Justice Holmes spoke of the "substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent"; 4 in the case incorporating freedom of speech and press into
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 5 Justice Sanford spoke
of the legislative determination "that utterances of a certain kind involve such
danger of substantive evil that they may be punished"; 6 and in other early
cases involving questions of state interference with freedom of speech and press,'
the Court spoke of the "public welfare,"' s and the "general welfare."8 9 When
the Court finally explained why freedom of speech and press had been incor-
porated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Chief Justice
Hughes stated:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system.
0
Surely, a liberty that is "essential to the security of the Republic" contributes to
the common good.
Conclusion
The incorporation of freedom of speech and press into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment has widened the area in which this essen-
tial freedom applies; it has also increased the responsibility of the Supreme
Court. For it is not enough to assert that freedom of speech and press is pro-
tected against state invasion; the freedom must be continually defined and
redefined in application to concrete cases. Every claim to a constitutionally
guaranteed right is not necessarily valid, and unless the right to freedom of
communication is wisely interpreted, its continuance may be jeopardized. 1
Although the Court has developed some subsidiary principles in elaborating the
general principle that freedom of speech and press is included within the liberty
of the due process clause, it is proposed that the questions suggested in this paper
as derived from the natural law offer additional guidance to the Court. These
criteria do not exhaust the possibilities for natural-law standards, but they could
help the Court to interpret freedom of communication in a manner that will
strengthen the constitutional position of this fundamental right.
83 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
84 Id. at 52.
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